Can Illinois Prosecutors Introduce Evidence Of “Other Crimes” To Prove My Guilt?
People v. Rowland: Illinois Appellate Court Orders New Trial After Improper Other-Crimes Evidence
A defendant’s alleged involvement in an unrelated drug offense became the focus of an Illinois appeal after prosecutors introduced the evidence during an attempted murder trial.
Illinois generally does not allow prosecutors to introduce evidence of other crimes simply to persuade a jury that a defendant is the type of person who commits crimes. This principle is reflected in Illinois Rule of Evidence 404(b), which generally bars other-crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence when offered solely to establish a person’s character and show that the person acted consistently with that character.
Other-crimes evidence can sometimes be admitted for a legitimate non-propensity purpose, such as proving motive, intent, identity, knowledge, preparation, or absence of mistake. Illinois law also contains specific statutory exceptions, including a provision allowing certain prior domestic-violence evidence in domestic-violence prosecutions. ([illinoiscourts.gov](https://www.illinoiscourts.gov/courts-supreme-court-illinois-rules-of-evidence/?utm_source=chatgpt.com))
In People v. Rowland, 2023 IL App (4th) 220106-U, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District concluded that the State improperly introduced evidence that Tommy E. Rowland had supplied methamphetamine to his estranged wife, Shannon Rowland. The appellate court determined that the drug evidence constituted other-crimes evidence, that the State had not properly disclosed its intention to introduce it, and that the State failed to argue on appeal that the error was harmless.
The court therefore reversed Rowland’s convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. [ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net]
Important distinction:
The appellate court did not say that all other-crimes evidence is inadmissible. It specifically addressed the prosecution’s introduction of evidence that Rowland possessed and delivered methamphetamine and distinguished that evidence from the prior domestic-violence evidence the trial court had separately admitted under Illinois law.
What Happened in People v. Rowland?
Tommy E. Rowland and Shannon Rowland were married, but they were living separately in June 2019.
On June 18, 2019, Shannon went to Rowland’s home. During the visit, she placed a 911 call requesting assistance and alleged that Rowland had beaten her and stabbed her in the neck.
Rowland left the residence. Law enforcement officers subsequently detained him following a brief pursuit and transported him to a hospital.
The State charged Rowland with attempted murder, domestic battery, aggravated domestic battery, and unlawful restraint.
The case went to a jury trial, where the State relied heavily on Shannon’s testimony concerning the events inside Rowland’s home.
The Defense Intended to Challenge Shannon’s Credibility
Before trial, the defense told the court that it expected to present evidence that Shannon used methamphetamine and was addicted to the drug.
Defense counsel believed Shannon’s drug use was relevant to her ability to accurately remember what happened and potentially relevant to whether she, rather than Rowland, had been the aggressor.
The defense sought permission to test hair collected at the scene for evidence of methamphetamine use. The trial court denied that request.
The defense also intended to introduce photographs that allegedly depicted Shannon smoking what counsel believed was methamphetamine. The State challenged those photographs, arguing that there was not sufficient foundation establishing either that Shannon was the person shown or that the substance was methamphetamine.
Why Shannon’s Drug Use Became Relevant
The defense intended to use evidence of Shannon’s drug use to challenge the credibility and reliability of the State’s principal witness. That did not, however, give the State unlimited authority to introduce evidence of separate criminal conduct allegedly committed by Rowland.
The State Decided to “Front” Shannon’s Drug Use
At trial, the prosecution chose to introduce Shannon’s methamphetamine use during her direct examination.
Shannon testified that there were times when she was afraid that she would fall asleep while making the long drive between Missouri and Illinois to visit Rowland.
The prosecutor asked her what she did to stay awake. Shannon answered that she used methamphetamine.
The prosecutor then asked Shannon where she obtained the methamphetamine.
Shannon responded that she obtained it from Rowland.
That answer transformed evidence about Shannon’s personal drug use into evidence that Rowland allegedly possessed and delivered methamphetamine.
The Question That Changed the Evidentiary Issue
The Fourth District did not criticize the State merely for acknowledging Shannon’s drug use. The court specifically focused on the prosecutor’s follow-up question asking who supplied the methamphetamine, because that answer implicated Rowland in separate criminal conduct.
Why the Methamphetamine Evidence Was Considered Other-Crimes Evidence
Illinois Rule of Evidence 404(b) generally provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts cannot be used to establish a person’s character in order to show that the person acted in conformity with that character.
The rule does allow other-crimes evidence for certain other purposes, including motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident.
In Rowland, the Fourth District rejected the State’s argument that the testimony did not qualify as other-crimes evidence simply because Rowland was not being prosecuted for a drug offense in the case before the jury.
The court pointed out that both possession and delivery of methamphetamine are criminal offenses under Illinois law. The State’s evidence therefore involved alleged criminal conduct outside the offenses for which Rowland was being tried. [ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net]
Illinois law separately criminalizes knowing possession of methamphetamine under 720 ILCS 646/60 and knowing delivery or possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine under 720 ILCS 646/55. [ilga.gov]
Other-Crimes Evidence Cannot Be Used Simply to Show Bad Character
The basic policy behind Rule 404(b) is that a defendant should be judged on the evidence relating to the charged offenses rather than convicted because the jury believes the defendant is generally a bad person.
The Illinois Supreme Court has explained that other-crimes evidence can be especially prejudicial because jurors may use it to conclude that a defendant deserves punishment based on past or unrelated conduct rather than determining whether the State proved the charged offense. [law.justia.com]
That does not mean other-crimes evidence is categorically excluded. If the evidence is relevant to a legitimate issue in the case, such as motive or intent, it may be admissible after the court considers its probative value and the risk of unfair prejudice.
Propensity
Generally not a proper reason to admit other-crimes evidence in an ordinary criminal prosecution.
Motive or Intent
Other-crimes evidence may be relevant when it helps establish a legitimate disputed issue such as motive or intent.
Balancing
Even relevant other-crimes evidence can be excluded when its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value.
The Drug Evidence Had Little Connection to the Attempted Murder Charge
The Fourth District found the State’s particular drug evidence especially problematic because it had little or no legitimate connection to the charged offenses.
Rowland was being prosecuted for attempted murder, domestic battery, aggravated domestic battery, and unlawful restraint arising from an altercation with Shannon.
The alleged sale or delivery of methamphetamine to Shannon did not explain why Rowland allegedly attacked her, did not establish the mechanics of the alleged stabbing, and did not otherwise provide a legitimate non-propensity reason for the jury to hear that he supplied her with meth.
The court explained that the lack of connection to the charged offenses actually highlighted the danger of unfair prejudice.
Why similarity matters:
Illinois courts have recognized that other-crimes evidence generally needs a threshold connection to the charged offense when offered for a legitimate evidentiary purpose. Without that connection, the evidence is more likely to serve only as an improper suggestion about the defendant’s character or propensity.
The State Was Allowed to Address Shannon’s Drug Use
An important part of the appellate decision is what the court did not prohibit.
The Fourth District expressly stated that it did not fault the prosecution for addressing Shannon’s drug use during direct examination.
Because the defense planned to argue that Shannon’s methamphetamine use affected her credibility, the State had a legitimate strategic reason to “front” that information rather than allowing the defense to surprise the jury with it later.
The problem arose when the prosecution asked the additional question identifying Rowland as the source of the methamphetamine.
Where the Court Drew the Line
Permissible trial strategy: Addressing Shannon’s own drug use because the defense planned to use it to attack her credibility.
Improper evidence: Eliciting testimony that Rowland supplied the methamphetamine when that alleged drug offense was unrelated to the charges being tried.
The State Had Not Disclosed the Drug Evidence in Advance
The Fourth District also found the admission improper because the State had not disclosed its intention to introduce the evidence that Rowland supplied Shannon with methamphetamine.
Illinois Rule of Evidence 404(c) contains advance-disclosure requirements for other-crimes evidence. The rule generally requires the prosecution to provide reasonable notice of its intent to introduce such evidence, subject to the rule’s provisions concerning timing and good cause.
In Rowland, the State did not disclose in advance that it intended to present testimony that Rowland had supplied Shannon with methamphetamine.
That lack of disclosure was significant because the defense could have investigated or prepared to address the allegation differently had it known the prosecution intended to present it.
The Defense Moved for a Mistrial
After Shannon testified that Rowland supplied her with methamphetamine, the defense moved for a mistrial.
Defense counsel argued that the testimony introduced previously undisclosed evidence that Rowland had committed separate drug crimes.
Counsel also argued that the State’s questioning went beyond simply addressing Shannon’s drug use and intentionally introduced evidence damaging to Rowland’s character.
The trial court denied the motion. The judge found that the State was attempting to “front” Shannon’s drug use and that the defense would be permitted to cross-examine her about the subject.
The trial then continued, and the jury ultimately found Rowland guilty of the charged offenses.
The Jury Was Not Given a Limiting Instruction
Another problem identified by the Fourth District was the absence of a limiting instruction explaining how the jury was supposed to consider the testimony that Rowland possessed or delivered methamphetamine.
Ordinarily, when evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, a limiting instruction can help prevent jurors from considering the evidence for an improper purpose.
In Rowland, the jury was not instructed that the evidence concerning Rowland supplying methamphetamine could be considered only for a particular permissible purpose.
The appellate court noted that the absence of such an instruction meant the jury was free to consider the testimony in whatever way it saw fit, including as improper propensity evidence.
Why a Limiting Instruction Can Matter
When other-crimes evidence is properly admitted for a limited purpose, jurors may be instructed not to use that evidence as proof that the defendant has a criminal character and therefore committed the charged crime. Rowland’s jury received no such instruction concerning the improper methamphetamine evidence.
What About Prior Domestic-Violence Evidence?
The Rowland case also involved evidence of prior alleged domestic violence, but that evidence must be distinguished from the methamphetamine evidence that resulted in reversal.
Before trial, the State sought permission to introduce prior instances of alleged domestic violence involving Shannon and another woman. The trial court allowed that evidence under 725 ILCS 5/115-7.4.
That statute creates a specific evidentiary rule for certain domestic-violence prosecutions and permits evidence of a defendant’s other domestic-violence offenses for matters to which the evidence is relevant, subject to balancing for undue prejudice. [ilga.gov]
Thus, the appellate decision should not be summarized as holding that the State could not introduce any prior bad-act evidence against Rowland. The court’s reversal specifically concerned the improperly elicited methamphetamine possession and delivery evidence.
The Defense Did Not Preserve Every Possible Objection
The Fourth District noted that Rowland did not make a contemporaneous objection specifically identifying the testimony as improper other-crimes evidence.
At trial, the defense objected to the testimony on the basis of discovery obligations and later argued that the State’s failure to disclose the information violated Brady v. Maryland.
Rowland raised the other-crimes-evidence argument in his posttrial motion and supporting memorandum.
Normally, an issue that is not properly preserved may be forfeited on appeal. But the Fourth District noted that the State did not argue that Rowland had forfeited the other-crimes issue.
Under Illinois law, the State itself can forfeit a forfeiture argument by failing to raise it on appeal. The Fourth District therefore proceeded to consider the merits of the other-crimes issue. [ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net]
Why the Fourth District Found Error
The appellate court identified several separate problems with the methamphetamine testimony.
Separate Criminal Conduct
The testimony alleged that Rowland possessed and delivered methamphetamine.
Little Connection
The alleged drug offense had no demonstrated threshold similarity to the charged violent offenses.
No Advance Disclosure
The State had not disclosed its intention to introduce the evidence as required by Rule 404(c).
No Limiting Instruction
The jury received no instruction restricting the purposes for which it could consider the evidence.
The State Did Not Argue Harmless Error
Once the Fourth District determined that the admission of the methamphetamine evidence was improper, the court ordinarily would have considered whether the error was harmless.
An evidentiary error does not necessarily require a new trial if the State can establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the outcome.
But the prosecution did not make that argument in its appellate briefing.
The Fourth District expressly noted that this was significant. Because the State failed to argue harmless error, it forfeited the argument.
Why That Mattered
The court explained that improper admission of other-crimes evidence carries a high risk of prejudice and ordinarily may require reversal. Because the State did not argue that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellate court did not undertake that analysis on the State’s behalf.
The Fourth District Ordered a New Trial
The Fourth District concluded that the admission of the evidence that Rowland possessed and delivered methamphetamine was improper.
The court also found that the State failed to properly disclose the evidence before trial and failed to present a harmless-error argument on appeal.
Because the evidentiary issue was dispositive, the court did not need to decide Rowland’s additional arguments concerning ineffective assistance of counsel or the cumulative impact of other alleged errors.
Final Result
The Fourth District reversed the trial court’s judgment.
The case was remanded for a new trial.
What People v. Rowland Means for Illinois Criminal Cases
People v. Rowland demonstrates that prosecutors cannot automatically introduce every allegation of criminal or wrongful conduct simply because they believe it may make the defendant look less credible or more dangerous.
When prosecutors seek to introduce other-crimes evidence, the court must determine whether the evidence is relevant for a legitimate purpose and whether it can be admitted under the applicable evidentiary rules without creating undue prejudice.
The case also demonstrates why the precise question asked by a prosecutor can matter. The Fourth District did not object to the State addressing Shannon’s own methamphetamine use because the defense intended to raise that subject. The problem was the additional question that elicited evidence portraying Rowland as the person who supplied the methamphetamine.
That distinction may be important in other criminal trials where prosecutors attempt to address potentially damaging evidence before the defense does.
Other-Crimes Evidence Has Exceptions
It would be inaccurate to say that Illinois law always prohibits evidence of other crimes.
Under Illinois Rule of Evidence 404(b), other-crimes evidence may be admissible for legitimate purposes other than proving propensity, including motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident.
Illinois statutes also contain specific exceptions. For example, 725 ILCS 5/115-7.4 permits certain evidence of other domestic-violence offenses in qualifying domestic-violence prosecutions, subject to the statutory requirements and a prejudice analysis. [ilga.gov]
The existence of an exception does not mean every piece of other-crimes evidence must be admitted. Relevance, statutory requirements, notice, and the risk of undue prejudice can all matter.
The Legal Question Is Usually More Specific Than “Is This Bad-Act Evidence?”
Courts generally ask why the evidence is being offered, whether it is relevant to a legitimate issue, whether a statutory exception applies, whether required notice was provided, and whether the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the evidence’s probative value.
Preserving Evidentiary Issues at Trial
Rowland also provides a useful reminder about preserving objections for appeal.
Illinois generally requires a defendant to object to an alleged error at trial and raise the issue again in a posttrial motion. An objection on one legal ground may not preserve a different evidentiary objection for appellate review.
Rowland’s specific other-crimes argument was considered because the State did not assert forfeiture on appeal. The Fourth District expressly noted that the State itself could forfeit its forfeiture argument.
That procedural point was important to the outcome and is one reason the appellate decision should be understood in the context of its particular record rather than as a general rule that every unpreserved evidentiary error will receive appellate review.
A Note About This Decision
People v. Rowland, 2023 IL App (4th) 220106-U was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23. The order expressly states that it is not precedent, except in the limited circumstances allowed by Rule 23(e)(1).
The decision is therefore useful for explaining how the Fourth District applied Illinois evidence law to Rowland’s particular trial, but it should not be described as a precedential Illinois appellate opinion.
Talk to an Illinois Criminal Defense Lawyer
Serious criminal cases can involve complicated disputes over what evidence the jury should be permitted to hear. Other-crimes evidence, prior bad acts, domestic-violence evidence, and allegations of unrelated criminal conduct can all raise important questions concerning relevance, prejudice, notice, and the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Patel Law, PC represents Illinois residents facing serious criminal charges, including violent-crime allegations. Our attorneys can review the charges, evidence, motions, and trial issues that may affect your defense.
Contact our Champaign violent crimes lawyers to discuss your case and the legal options available to you.
Sources
People v. Rowland, 2023 IL App (4th) 220106-U — Official Illinois Appellate Court Opinion
Illinois Supreme Court Rules of Evidence — Rule 404(b)
725 ILCS 5/115-7.4 — Evidence in Domestic Violence Cases
720 ILCS 646/55 and 720 ILCS 646/60 — Methamphetamine Delivery and Possession
