15-Year-Old Defendant Charged with First-Degree Murder
The Fifth District rejected a successive post-conviction challenge to a negotiated guilty plea and 35-year sentence imposed after a 15-year-old was prosecuted as an adult.
In People v. Guise, 2023 IL App (5th) 220655-U, the Illinois Fifth District Appellate Court affirmed the denial of Michael D. Guise’s request for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition.
Guise was 15 years old when he was charged with four counts of first-degree murder and two counts of armed robbery following the July 2010 shooting death of Ishmael Adams. He ultimately entered a negotiated guilty plea to a new murder charge that eliminated the firearm enhancement. In exchange, the State recommended a 35-year sentence and dismissed the remaining charges.
Guise later argued that his plea and sentence were unconstitutional because he had been told that he could receive a natural-life sentence if he went to trial. He also challenged his 35-year sentence under the constitutional principles governing juvenile sentencing and argued that his sentence required him to serve his entire term without parole eligibility.
Quick Answer
The appellate court affirmed the denial of leave to file the successive petition. The court explained that Guise could not establish “cause” for failing to raise his Miller-based sentencing argument earlier because he had already raised a similar issue in an earlier post-conviction petition. He also could not establish “prejudice” because his 35-year sentence resulted from a fully negotiated guilty plea and was below the 40-year threshold that Illinois courts have identified as a de facto life sentence for purposes of the juvenile-sentencing principles at issue.
The Charges Against Michael Guise
On August 4, 2010, Michael D. Guise was charged in Macon County with four counts of first-degree murder under 720 ILCS 5/9-1 and two counts of armed robbery under 720 ILCS 5/18-2.
The charges arose from the July 30, 2010 shooting death of Ishmael Adams. The murder counts alleged that Guise personally discharged a handgun that caused Adams’ death.
Guise was 15 years old when the offense occurred. He was prosecuted in adult court.
Age at Offense
Guise was 15 years old when the shooting occurred.
Murder Charges
He was originally charged with four counts of first-degree murder.
Armed Robbery
He was also charged with two counts of armed robbery.
The Negotiated Guilty Plea
On November 7, 2011, the State and defense presented an agreed disposition to the circuit court. Under the agreement, Guise would plead guilty to a newly charged murder offense that eliminated the firearm enhancement.
In exchange, the State agreed to recommend a 35-year prison sentence and dismiss the remaining charges.
As part of the negotiated disposition, Guise also agreed to provide an under-oath statement concerning the offense. He testified about a plan involving himself and three other people to rob Adams.
YEARS
Negotiated Sentence
The State recommended a 35-year sentence in exchange for Guise’s guilty plea and dismissal of the remaining charges.
The Trial Court Admonished Guise Before Accepting the Plea
Before accepting the guilty plea, the circuit court informed Guise of the charge and the potential penalties. The court also explained the constitutional rights he would give up by pleading guilty, including his right to a jury trial.
Guise stated that he understood the court’s admonishments. He expressed a desire to plead guilty and signed a written jury waiver.
The court also asked Guise whether anyone had forced or threatened him to plead guilty. Guise stated that he was pleading guilty of his own free will, that nobody had forced or threatened him, and that nobody had promised him anything beyond the terms of the negotiated agreement.
Rights Explained
The court explained the rights Guise would waive by pleading guilty.
Jury Waiver
Guise signed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial.
Voluntary Plea
Guise stated that no one forced or threatened him to plead guilty.
The Attempt to Withdraw the Plea
Approximately one month after the plea, defense counsel filed a motion seeking to withdraw it. The motion did not identify any specific grounds for withdrawal. Counsel explained that a relative had contacted her and said Guise wanted to withdraw his plea, but counsel had been unable to meet with Guise because he was still going through the Department of Corrections intake process.
At a later hearing, counsel told the court that Guise had informed her in writing that he no longer wanted to pursue withdrawal of the plea. Counsel therefore withdrew the motion.
Guise later alleged that his public defender had coerced him into accepting the plea by repeatedly telling him that he would receive a natural-life sentence if he went to trial and that it would be difficult to convince a jury of his innocence because his three codefendants were identifying him as the shooter.
The Coercion Allegation
Guise later characterized his attorney’s warnings about the potential consequences of a trial as coercive. The appellate courts, however, did not find that the plea record itself established coercion. At the plea hearing, Guise expressly told the judge that he was pleading guilty voluntarily and that no one had forced or threatened him.
The First Post-Conviction Petition
In May 2015, Guise filed a pro se post-conviction petition. He alleged that his plea was coerced by his public defender and that counsel had failed to properly pursue his request to withdraw the plea.
Guise alleged that his attorney told him he would receive a natural-life sentence if he went to trial. He also claimed that counsel repeatedly told him it would be difficult to persuade a jury that he was innocent because his three codefendants were claiming that he killed Adams.
The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition. The appellate court affirmed in People v. Guise, 2017 IL App (4th) 150683-U, concluding that the record supported the determination that Guise had voluntarily waived his right to pursue an appeal of the plea.
Guise Later Raised Juvenile-Sentencing Claims
On November 7, 2019, Guise sought leave to file a successive post-conviction petition. He raised three principal arguments.
Proportionate Penalties
Guise argued that his 35-year sentence violated the proportionate-penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.
Truth in Sentencing
He argued that requiring him to serve the applicable percentage of his sentence without parole eligibility created a constitutional problem because he was a juvenile when the offense was committed.
Alleged Coercion
He argued that repeated warnings that he could spend the rest of his life in prison caused him to accept the 35-year plea agreement.
Juvenile Sentencing Law in Illinois
Illinois law contains special sentencing provisions for people who were under 18 when they committed an offense. Under 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105, a sentencing court generally must consider additional youth-related mitigation factors when sentencing a person who was under 18 at the time of the offense.
Those factors include the individual’s age, maturity, ability to appreciate risks and consequences, susceptibility to outside pressure, family and home environment, potential for rehabilitation, circumstances of the offense, degree of participation, ability to participate meaningfully in the defense, criminal history, and other relevant information.
The statute was enacted after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, which addressed mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders. Illinois courts have subsequently applied Miller, Graham v. Florida, and related Illinois cases when evaluating lengthy juvenile sentences.
40-Year Threshold
In People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a prison sentence of 40 years or more for a juvenile offender constitutes a de facto life sentence for purposes of the constitutional principles discussed in the case. Guise’s negotiated 35-year sentence fell below that threshold.
Why the 35-Year Sentence Was Not a De Facto Life Sentence
In the 2023 decision, the Fifth District relied on People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 in concluding that Guise’s 35-year sentence did not qualify as a de facto life sentence. Because the sentence was less than 40 years, the court determined that Buffer did not provide a basis for Guise’s successive petition.
The court also relied on People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432. The Illinois Supreme Court held in Jones that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives constitutional challenges based on subsequent changes in applicable law in the circumstances presented there.
The Fifth District concluded that Guise’s fully negotiated plea also made the sentencing-hearing argument unavailable in the manner he proposed. Because he agreed to the 35-year sentence as part of the plea bargain, the circuit court did not independently impose a discretionary sentence after a contested sentencing hearing.
Guise Sentence
The negotiated sentence was 35 years.
Buffer Threshold
Illinois identified 40 years or more as the threshold for a de facto life sentence in the context addressed by Buffer.
What Is a Successive Post-Conviction Petition?
Illinois generally permits one post-conviction petition as a matter of right. A defendant seeking to file a successive petition must first obtain permission from the court.
Under 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f), a defendant seeking to file a successive post-conviction petition must demonstrate cause for failing to raise the claim in the earlier proceeding and prejudice resulting from that failure, subject to the statute’s provisions for actual-innocence claims.
Cause
The defendant must identify an objective factor external to the defense that prevented the earlier presentation of the claim.
Prejudice
The defendant must show that the claimed constitutional error caused the required prejudice.
Why Guise Could Not Satisfy the Cause Requirement
Guise argued that his inability to raise the juvenile-sentencing issue earlier was caused by the fact that Miller v. Alabama had not been decided when he entered his 2011 guilty plea.
The Fifth District rejected that argument because Miller was decided in 2012, before Guise filed his first post-conviction petition in 2015 and before his second petition. The court noted that Guise had actually raised a Miller-related claim in his second post-conviction proceeding.
Because he had already had an opportunity to raise the issue, the court concluded that Guise could not establish cause for filing another successive petition on the same general theory.
The Timing Was Critical
The court did not say that juvenile-sentencing claims can never be raised in post-conviction proceedings. It held that Guise could not use a successive petition because the legal authority he identified as the basis for the claim existed before his earlier post-conviction proceedings and he had already raised a Miller-related argument.
Why the Court Found No Prejudice
The Fifth District concluded that Guise also failed to demonstrate prejudice. His sentence was the result of a fully negotiated guilty plea, and the agreed 35-year sentence was below the 40-year de facto-life threshold recognized in Buffer.
The court relied on People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, explaining that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea can waive constitutional challenges based on later changes in the law. The appellate court also noted that the circuit court had not failed to exercise discretion because it accepted a negotiated agreement rather than imposing an independently determined sentence after a sentencing hearing.
The Appellate Court’s Holding
The court concluded that Guise could establish neither cause nor prejudice under the statute governing successive post-conviction petitions. It therefore affirmed the circuit court’s denial of leave to file the successive petition.
The Court Did Not Hold That Juveniles Can Never Receive Long Sentences
The decision should not be read as a broad statement that Illinois juveniles prosecuted as adults can never receive lengthy prison sentences. Illinois law now requires courts to consider specific youth-related mitigating factors when sentencing a person who was under 18 at the time of the offense, and Illinois appellate decisions continue to apply constitutional principles concerning lengthy juvenile sentences.
Rather, People v. Guise, 2023 IL App (5th) 220655-U addressed whether this particular defendant had satisfied the statutory requirements for a successive post-conviction petition challenging a negotiated 35-year sentence.
The court’s answer was no because Guise could not establish the required cause and prejudice. The decision also relied on the fact that his sentence was below the 40-year threshold and resulted from a voluntary negotiated guilty plea.
A Rule 23 Decision
The 2023 decision was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23. The order expressly states that it is not precedent except in the limited circumstances permitted under Rule 23(e)(1).
The Fifth District also granted the Office of the State Appellate Defender leave to withdraw as appellate counsel after concluding that the appeal presented no reasonably meritorious issue.
Talk to a Decatur, IL Criminal Defense Lawyer Today
Criminal cases involving juvenile defendants can raise complicated constitutional and sentencing issues, particularly when a defendant is prosecuted as an adult and enters a negotiated guilty plea. Later post-conviction proceedings may also involve strict requirements concerning successive petitions, cause, prejudice, and newly developed legal authority.
Patel Law, PC represents defendants facing serious criminal charges and defendants pursuing appeals and post-conviction relief. Our Decatur criminal defense lawyers can review the history of your case and explain the legal options that may be available.
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Sources
People v. Guise, 2023 IL App (5th) 220655-U — Illinois Appellate Court Opinion
730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 — Sentencing of Individuals Under 18 at the Time of the Offense
725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. — Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act
People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327
People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432
