Defendant Sentenced to 120 Years for Predatory Criminal Sexual Assault of a Child

The 2024 Fifth District decision involved a 120-year sentence, multiple Krankel proceedings, and a later challenge to the constitutionality of the statute used to convict the defendant.

In People v. Anderson, 2024 IL App (5th) 220774-U, the Illinois Fifth District Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of a petition filed by a defendant serving an aggregate 120-year sentence for four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child.

David K. Anderson was originally convicted in 2010 and sentenced in 2011 to 30 years on each of four counts, with the sentences ordered to run consecutively. His case generated multiple appeals, including earlier appeals involving his pro se claims that his trial counsel had been ineffective. Those earlier proceedings resulted in multiple Krankel inquiries concerning his request for new counsel.

The 2024 decision, however, addressed a different proceeding. Anderson had filed a petition for relief from judgment under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401, arguing that the criminal statute under which he had been convicted was facially unconstitutional. The Fifth District rejected that argument and affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal.

Quick Answer

The Fifth District did not grant Anderson relief from his convictions or 120-year sentence. The appellate court held that his section 2-1401 petition was properly dismissed because his challenge to the predatory criminal sexual assault statute lacked merit. The court also explained that section 2-1401 is not the proper vehicle for raising claims that could have been presented on direct appeal, such as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

The decision was filed on January 4, 2024, as a Supreme Court Rule 23 order. It is therefore not precedential except in the limited circumstances permitted by the rule.

The Case’s History

In 2010, Anderson was charged by information with four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child under the version of the Illinois Criminal Code then in effect.

A jury found Anderson guilty on all four counts. In 2011, the circuit court sentenced him to 30 years in prison on each count, with the sentences to be served consecutively. His aggregate sentence was therefore 120 years.

Original Sentence

Convictions

Four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child

Years Each

Each sentence was ordered to run consecutively

120

Total Years

Aggregate prison sentence

Anderson appealed his conviction and argued, among other things, that his trial counsel had been ineffective. The Fourth District Appellate Court agreed with one of his arguments concerning the procedure used after he raised his own pro se claims of ineffective assistance.

In People v. Anderson, 2012 IL App (4th) 110275-U, the Fourth District held that the trial court had failed to conduct an adequate preliminary inquiry into Anderson’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The case was remanded for a proper inquiry.

What Is a Krankel Hearing?

Illinois courts use the term “Krankel hearing” to describe the procedure a trial court follows after a defendant raises a pro se claim that his or her defense counsel was ineffective. The procedure comes from People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984).

A Krankel inquiry gives the trial judge an opportunity to examine the defendant’s allegations and determine whether they show possible neglect of the case. The initial inquiry is designed to determine whether new counsel should be appointed to investigate and potentially litigate the ineffective-assistance allegations.

The Basic Krankel Process

Defendant Raises a Claim

The defendant personally raises a claim that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance.

Court Makes an Inquiry

The judge examines the factual basis of the defendant’s allegations.

Counsel May Be Appointed

If the allegations show possible neglect, the court may appoint independent counsel to investigate them.

If the defendant’s allegations are facially meritless, relate only to matters of trial strategy, or are contradicted by the record, the court generally may deny the request for new counsel after conducting the appropriate inquiry.

If the defendant’s allegations suggest possible neglect of the case, the court should appoint new counsel to independently investigate the claims. The new attorney may then determine whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate.

Anderson Had Multiple Krankel Inquiries

Anderson’s case involved more than one Krankel proceeding. After the Fourth District determined that the original trial court inquiry was inadequate, the case was remanded for another inquiry into Anderson’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

On the first remand, the circuit court conducted a second preliminary inquiry and again declined to appoint substitute counsel. Anderson appealed again.

The Fourth District subsequently remanded the case for a third preliminary inquiry and specifically directed that the State not participate adversarially in that inquiry.

During the third Krankel inquiry, the circuit court again denied the appointment of substitute counsel and denied Anderson’s pro se motion for a new trial. The Fourth District later affirmed that judgment.

Anderson’s Appellate History

First Review

Fourth District found the original Krankel inquiry inadequate.

Second Remand

The circuit court conducted another inquiry but did not appoint substitute counsel.

Third Inquiry

The circuit court again denied new counsel, and the Fourth District ultimately affirmed.

Anderson later filed a lengthy postconviction petition in 2017 containing numerous constitutional claims. That petition was summarily dismissed, and the Fourth District affirmed the dismissal.

The 2024 Petition Raised a Different Legal Issue

On February 24, 2022, Anderson filed the petition that resulted in the 2024 Fifth District decision. Rather than seeking another Krankel inquiry, he filed a petition for relief from judgment under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401.

Anderson argued that the statute under which he was convicted, section 12-14.1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961, was facially unconstitutional because he believed it was incomplete, vague, and overbroad.

More specifically, Anderson argued that the statute did not contain an express mental-state requirement, did not adequately distinguish innocent conduct from criminal conduct, and did not provide adequate notice of what conduct could result in criminal liability.

What Anderson Was Challenging

Anderson was not asking the Fifth District to conduct another Krankel hearing in the 2024 appeal. He was arguing that his underlying criminal judgment was void because the statute used to convict him was allegedly unconstitutional.

The Appellate Court Rejected the Constitutional Challenge

The Fifth District rejected Anderson’s argument that the predatory criminal sexual assault statute was facially unconstitutional.

At the time of Anderson’s prosecution, the relevant statute provided that a person committed predatory criminal sexual assault of a child when the person was 17 years of age or older and committed an act of sexual penetration with a victim under 13 years of age.

The court acknowledged that the statute did not expressly state a mental state in the particular subsection at issue. However, Illinois’ Criminal Code provides that when a criminal statute does not specify a mental state for an offense, a mental state of intent, knowledge, or recklessness may be implied under the general provisions of the Code.

The appellate court also noted that the jury at Anderson’s trial had been instructed that it had to find that he intentionally or knowingly committed the act of sexual penetration. The court therefore concluded that the statute was not so incomplete, vague, or overbroad as to render Anderson’s convictions void.

Appellate Court’s Conclusion

The Fifth District held that the statute was not facially unconstitutional and that Anderson’s judgment of conviction was therefore not void on the basis he asserted. The circuit court properly dismissed the section 2-1401 petition.

Section 2-1401 Has Important Limitations

Section 2-1401 provides a procedure for seeking relief from final judgments in civil and criminal proceedings. Under 35 ILCS 5/2-1401, petition generally must be filed within two years after the challenged judgment or order, although the statute contains an exception for judgments that are void.

Anderson attempted to rely on that exception by arguing that his convictions were void because the statute was unconstitutional from its inception.

The Fifth District rejected the argument. The court explained that Anderson’s constitutional challenge lacked merit and that his convictions were not void.

Anderson also raised arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence and jurisdiction in his appellate brief. The Fifth District explained that a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim that could have been raised on direct appeal generally cannot be repackaged as a section 2-1401 claim.

Different Post-Conviction Procedures Serve Different Purposes

Krankel Inquiry

Addresses a defendant’s pro se allegations that trial counsel was ineffective and determines whether substitute counsel should be appointed.

Section 2-1401 Petition

Provides a procedure for seeking relief from a final judgment, subject to statutory requirements and limitations.

What People v. Anderson Means for Illinois Criminal Cases

People v. Anderson, 2024 IL App (5th) 220774-U demonstrates why the type of post-conviction proceeding matters when a defendant is attempting to challenge a criminal judgment. A Krankel inquiry addresses allegations of ineffective assistance by trial counsel, while a section 2-1401 proceeding has a different purpose and different procedural requirements.

Anderson’s earlier appeals resulted in multiple Krankel inquiries because he repeatedly alleged that his attorney had provided ineffective assistance. The 2024 appeal, however, centered on whether the judgment was void because the statute supporting the convictions was allegedly unconstitutional.

The Fifth District concluded that the statute was constitutionally sufficient and that Anderson’s later claims did not provide a basis for disturbing the final judgment. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal of his petition for relief from judgment.

Final Result

120

Years

Aggregate sentence remained in place

Affirmed

Appellate Result

Section 2-1401 dismissal upheld

Talk to a Decatur, IL Criminal Defense Attorney Today

Patel Law, P.C. represents the interests of those charged with serious crimes in Illinois and individuals seeking to challenge criminal convictions. Call our Decatur, IL criminal defense attorneys at 217-384-1111 to schedule a consultation and discuss your defense options.